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Recent efforts to endogenize technological change in climate policy models demonstrate the importance
of accounting for the opportunity cost of climate R&D investments.  Because the social returns to
R&D investments are typically higher than the social returns to other types of investment, any new
climate mitigation R&D that comes at the expense of other R&D investment may dampen the overall
gains from induced technological change. Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work to guide
modelers as to the potential magnitude of such crowding out effects.  This paper considers both the
private and social opportunity costs of climate R&D.  Addressing private costs, we ask whether an
increase in climate R&D represents new R&D spending, or whether some (or all) of the additional
climate R&D comes at the expense of other R&D.  Addressing social costs, we use patent citations
to compare the social value of alternative energy research to other types of R&D that may be crowded
out.  Beginning at the industry level, we find some evidence of crowding out in sectors active in energy
R&D, but not in sectors that do not perform energy R&D.  This suggests that funds for energy R&D
do not come from other sectors, but may come from a redistribution of research funds in sectors that
are likely to perform energy R&D.  Given this, we proceed with a detailed look at climate R&D in
two sectors – alternative energy and automotive manufacturing.  Linking patent data and financial
data by firm, we ask whether an increase in alternative energy patents leads to a decrease in other types
of patenting activity.   We find crowding out for alternative energy firms, but no evidence of crowding
out for automotive firms.  Finally, we use patent citation data to compare the social value of alternative
energy patents to other patents by these firms.  Alternative energy patents are cited more frequently,
and by a wider range of other technologies, than other patents by these firms, suggesting that their
social value is higher.
David Popp












richard.newell@duke.eduThroughout the world, proposals to reduce carbon emissions include increased research 
and development (R&D) funding (de Coninck et al 2008; Newell 2007).  Both a 1997 report 
from the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) and a 2004 
report from the bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy recommended doubling U.S. 
government energy R&D spending.  Others advocate increases by a factor of five or ten, likening 
the need for new energy technologies to the Manhattan Project’s efforts to create a nuclear 
weapon (Kammen & Nemet, 2005).  Such proposals raise two concerns.  First, R&D subsidies 
will likely have little effect unless accompanied by policies requiring significant emissions 
reductions.  Second, dramatic increases in energy R&D may come at a high cost, as these 
research efforts may draw away research funding and scientists from other productive sectors  
(Popp, 2006a, Yang & Oppenheimer, 2007, Schneider & Goulder, 1997).  This paper focuses on 
the second of these concerns, by asking whether new energy R&D efforts crowd out other types 
of R&D spending. 
Recent efforts to endogenize technological change in Integrated Assessment (IA) models 
of climate policy highlight the need to properly account for the opportunity cost of 
environmental R&D investments.  Because the social returns to R&D investments are typically 
higher than the social returns to other types of investment, any new environmental R&D that 
comes at the expense of other R&D investment will dampen the cost-savings potential of 
induced technological change.  Popp (2004) shows that assumptions about the magnitude of such 
crowding out explain much of the variation in results across IA models with induced 
technological change.  For example, among models that use R&D expenditures as the means by 
which technology improves, Nordhaus (2002) assumes a fixed supply of R&D labor, so that new 
energy R&D completely crowds out other R&D.  As a result, he finds induced technological  
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change has little effect on welfare or climate policy.  In contrast, Buonanno et al. (2003) model 
energy R&D and other R&D as complements, so that crowding out does not occur.  Their model 
finds a stronger effect for policy-induced R&D than other models. 
Note that the question of crowding out is even more important for IA models than it is for 
energy R&D policy.  In many IA models, such as those cited above, overall technological change 
is treated as exogenous.  While crowding out may be observed in the data, so that other R&D 
falls when energy R&D increases, this may simply be a result of rational, profit maximizing 
firms switching R&D resources from opportunities that become less profitable as energy prices 
increase (e.g. designing larger, gas-guzzling vehicles) to opportunities that are more profitable 
(e.g. designing hybrid vehicles).  In such a case, one might not be concerned about crowding out 
from the perspective of a policy maker increasing spending on energy R&D – in fact, such 
crowding out may be a desired policy effect.  However, in terms of these models, whether or not 
it is profitable to reduce R&D on other projects is irrelevant.  Since energy R&D is endogenous 
in these models, but other R&D is not, R&D resources switched from non-energy to energy 
projects will be double-counted unless the reduction in non-energy R&D is accounted for by 
reducing the level of autonomous technological change when more energy R&D is induced. That 
is, exogenous levels of autonomous technological change in these models should only include 
the effects of non-energy R&D.  If energy R&D replaces other forms of R&D, the effects of 
autonomous technological change must fall. 
Unfortunately, there has been little empirical work addressing the potential magnitude of 
such crowding out effects.  Related work includes Link (1982), who finds evidence that part of 
the measured decline in productivity R&D in the 1970s occurred because more R&D was 
directed towards environmental research, whose benefits (e.g. a cleaner environment) were not  
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measured in traditional market outcomes.  Using macroeconomic data, Nemet and Kamen (2007) 
find little evidence of crowding out from federal energy R&D spending.  However, in a survey of 
Austrian firms, Roediger-Schluga (2003) finds most firms cancelled or postponed other R&D 
projects in order to increase environmental R&D after passage of new volatile organic compound 
standards.
1  This paper addresses the crowding out issue directly, focusing on both the private 
and social opportunity costs of climate R&D.  Here, the key question is whether increases in 
energy R&D are likely to represent new R&D spending, or whether some (or all) of the 
additional climate R&D comes at the expense of, or crowds out, other R&D.  To address the 
social opportunity costs of climate R&D, we ask whether the social value of energy R&D differs 
from other types of innovation.  The paper also contributes to the literature on energy R&D by 
providing a detailed description of who performs this R&D.   
We explore the question of private R&D opportunity costs at several levels.  First, we 
examine the effect of economy-wide increases in energy R&D on total R&D spending at the 
industry level in order to investigate whether investment dollars flowing to energy-related 
research are coming at the expense of overall R&D in specific sectors.  While this first question 
addresses flows across sectors, it does not tell us whether and how research activity changes 
within individual firms as energy R&D activities increase.  To address this second question, we 
use patent data to examine changes in the research portfolios of companies actively performing 
energy R&D.  New climate R&D undertaken by firms will crowd out other R&D if firms are 
financially constrained.  Several papers have examined factors determining firm-level R&D 
financing and conclude that financial constraints are often present.  These results vary by country 
(e.g., financial constraints appear more binding in the U.S. and U.K. than in France and 
                                                 
1 In a related vein, several authors have asked whether increases in defense R&D spending crowds out other R&D.  
Examples include Morales-Ramos (2002), Buck et al. (1993), and Mueller and Atesoglu (1993).  
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Germany) and by firm size (financial constraints are more binding for smaller firms).
2  
Moreover, Lach & Schankerman (1988) show that firms tend to smooth R&D investment over 
time, suggesting that there are large adjustment costs to changing the level of R&D within a firm.  
However, such studies have typically used aggregate industry or firm-level R&D data.  Thus, 
they are unable to distinguish between types of R&D performed.  In this paper, we combine 
firm-level financial data taken from the Compustat database of publicly traded firms, with patent 
records for the same firms.  We use patent classifications to separately identify the results of 
energy research projects from other research.  Using these data, we can investigate whether 
increases in energy patents crowd out other patenting activity at the firm level. 
As we find some evidence of crowding out within sectors, we conclude by considering 
the social value of research by energy firms.  Using patent citation data as a measure of the social 
value of innovations, we ask whether energy patents are more valuable than other innovations.  
While we do find evidence that energy R&D patents are more valuable, they do not appear to be 
more valuable than the patents most likely to be crowded out by an increase in energy R&D. 
 
I. Crowding Out Across Sectors 
We begin by looking at the effect of energy R&D spending on overall R&D activity at 
the sectoral level.  Here, we are interested in whether R&D flows across sectors when energy 
R&D levels change, so that there is a net draw on R&D away from specific sectors.  For this, we 
use R&D data from the National Science Foundation Survey of Industrial Research and 
Development.  Defining IRDi,t as company-financed R&D performed in industry i at time t, ERDt 
                                                 
2 Recent papers on R&D financing constraints include Hall et al. (1999), who find stronger financial constraints in 
the U.S. than in Japan and France; Harhoff (1998), who finds weaker constraints in Germany, with smaller firms 
most affected; and Bougheas, Görg, & Strobl (2003), who find evidence of financial constraints in Irish firms.  Hall 
(2002) provides a review of this literature on firm-level financing of R&D.  
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as the level of total company-financed energy R&D spending in year t, FEDRDt as federally-
funded R&D performed by industry,
3 and Yi,t as value added in industry i at time t, we propose 
the following relationship: 
(1)   IRDi,t = f(IRDi,t-1, Yi,t-1, FEDRDt-1, ERDt).  
We include the lagged dependent variable to allow for gradual adjustment of R&D in response to 
changing conditions.  Standard errors are corrected for both autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
In this equation, energy R&D is endogenous, as both it and total sectoral-level R&D are 
influenced by factors such as energy prices.  Lagged industry-performed R&D is also 
endogenous.  Thus, we use an instrumental variables approach, using lagged values of the other 
independent variables, total company-financed energy R&D spending in year t-2 (ERDt-2), the 
price of energy,
4 gross domestic product, defense spending, and lagged federal energy R&D 
spending as instruments.
5  
One limitation to the above analysis is that industry-level energy R&D data are not 
available for all industries.  Although published energy R&D data include industry-level 
breakdowns, there are many missing observations in these data.  This is particularly true in 
industries that do not perform much energy R&D.  Thus, in this regression we are only able to 
include economy-wide energy R&D financed and performed by industry.  This allows us to 
focus on crowding out across sectors.  That is, as the total level of energy R&D spending goes 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, there are several missing observations in the industry-level data for federally-funded R&D 
performed by industry, so that we can only include aggregate levels of government-funded R&D.   
4 Energy price data come from the US Energy Information Administration, and are the consumption-weighted 
average price for primary energy and retail electricity in the four end-use sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, 
and transportation). 
5 Because of the large share of R&D spending that goes to defense, particularly during the 1980s, Lichtenberg 
(1987) finds a negative relationship between defense spending and the share of R&D going to energy.  Based on 
this, we include defense R&D as an instrumental variable.  
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up, do R&D resources flow from non-energy sectors to those doing more energy R&D?  Figure 1 
shows the trends in this variable, for both company-financed and federal-government financed 
energy R&D performed by industry.   
Our strategy for identifying crowding out across industries is to see how changes in the 
overall level of energy R&D spending affect company R&D performance at the industry-level.  
However, because we have total industry-level R&D on the left-hand side, but economy-wide 
energy R&D on the right-hand side, our dependent variable includes energy R&D financed by 
that industry.  Since our dependent variable will, in some cases, include energy R&D for that 
industry, careful interpretation of the coefficient on overall energy R&D is needed.  A coefficient 
of 0 suggests that R&D in that industry is not affected by increases in overall energy R&D.  
Whether no effect on total industry-level R&D should be considered crowding out depends on 
the ex ante level of energy R&D in the industry.  In industries that perform a significant amount 
of energy R&D, finding no increase in industry-wide R&D when energy R&D increases suggests 
the industry has cut back on other types of R&D.  However, a coefficient of 0 in an industry that 
does not perform energy R&D, such as the food industry, suggests that crowding out is not a 
problem.  For these industries, we would be concerned about crowding out only if the coefficient 
on energy R&D was negative – implying that an economy-wide increase in energy R&D took 
R&D resources away from this industry.  
Thus, we divide our sample of industries into two groups.  We begin by looking at the 
percentage of R&D devoted to energy R&D in years for which data are available.  We then 
separately consider industries for which spent, on average, 5% or more of total R&D 
expenditures on energy R&D and those which spent less than 5% on energy R&D.
6  Because of 
                                                 
6 For sensitivity analysis, we also present results using cutoffs of 1% and 10% for energy-R&D intensive industries.  
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data availability, we look at two samples. Using data from 1983-1997, we are able to include 16 
industries.  However, this does not allow us to look at crowding out during the energy crisis of 
the 1970s, when energy R&D levels were highest.  Thus, we also look at a subsample of 7 
industries that have data available from 1973-1997.  Tables 1 and 2 list the industries in the 
larger and smaller samples, respectively, along with descriptive data on the key industry 
variables.  The tables also show the average percentage of R&D devoted to energy within each 
sector, for the years in which industry-level detail is available.  In each table, the industries are 
sorted by this percentage.  Finally, note that the last two lines of each table present summary 
statistics for all industries with more than or less than five percent of R&D devoted to energy.  In 
both samples, energy intensive industries are larger.  These include industries such as petroleum 
refining and transportation equipment. 
We start with the results for the larger sample, which begins in 1983.  Table 3 presents 
these results.  Panel A presents results for our preferred model.  The first two columns present 
results for industries that perform little energy R&D.  Here, we see no evidence of crowding out.  
The insignificant coefficient on economy-wide private energy R&D spending suggests that 
increases in energy R&D elsewhere in the economy have no effect on overall R&D spending in 
these specific industries.  This result holds using either a 1% or 5% cut-off for energy-R&D 
intensive industries.  Thus, we find that increases in energy R&D spending do not appear to 
crowd out R&D in unrelated sectors. 
Results for other variables are generally as expected.  The model suggests that R&D 
adjusts gradually, as the coefficient on lagged company R&D spending is significant and close to 
1.  Industry value added increases R&D, although the magnitude of this effect is small.  Note 
from Table 1 that several of the industries in the low energy R&D group are industries with low  
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overall R&D intensities, which might explain this low magnitude.  Finally, the negative sign on 
federal R&D suggests crowding out from government R&D, although this coefficient is 
insignificant for low energy R&D industries. 
For industries that spend 5% or more of their R&D budget on energy R&D, the results 
are similar, but the interpretation is different. In columns 3 and 4, we see a coefficient on energy 
R&D that is not statistically different from zero.  Since these are industries that perform energy 
R&D, the null hypothesis of no crowding out would be that the coefficient on energy R&D 
equals 1.  That is, every dollar spent on energy R&D should be new spending, so that total R&D 
in the industry increases.  That null hypothesis is clearly rejected in all cases, suggesting 
crowding out within those sectors that perform energy R&D. As before, the coefficients on other 
variables appear reasonable.  Of particular interest here is the coefficient on value added of about 
0.02.  This is consistent with the fact that just over two percent of GDP is devoted to energy 
R&D.  We also see evidence for a small crowding out effect from federal R&D that is now 
statistically significant.   
One concern is the negative coefficient on energy R&D in column 4.  One issue may be 
endogeneity, particularly if other shocks to the economy, such as higher energy prices, affect 
industry value added.  To address this, we remove one outlier industry: petroleum refining and 
extraction.  Over 50% of R&D goes to energy in this sector, compared to 9% in the next highest 
sector.  Without petroleum, the results are similar, but the coefficient on energy R&D is now 
positive.  Still, we can reject the null hypothesis that this coefficient equals 1, suggesting some 
crowding out in these industries. 
A second potential concern with these results is that we have a weak instruments 
problem.  While our instruments our valid, as suggested by the high p-values for Hansen’s J- 
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statistic (Baum et al. 2007), the Wald F statistic based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is less 
than the “rule of thumb” of 10, suggesting weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Baum et 
al., 2007).  This results from the poor fit between our instruments and the lagged dependent 
variable.  For each regression, the F-stat for the first-stage regression of the lagged dependent 
variable is less than 10, whereas the F-stat for the first-stage regression of the energy R&D 
variable is consistently much larger than 10.  To address this, panel B of Table 3 presents an 
alternative estimation strategy, in which the three-year lag of the dependent variable is also used 
as an instrument.  While one might expect the three-year lag to be endogenous, particularly if 
adjustment is gradual, Hansen’s J-statistic still confirms the validity of our selected instruments.  
Moreover, for three of our specifications, the Wald F statistic based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
statistic is now greater than 10, and we reject the null hypothesis that the model is 
underidentified, at least at the 10 percent level, for each specification.  Most importantly, the 
main results do not change.  We still see no evidence of crowding out in low energy R&D 
industries, and evidence suggestive of crowding out in high-energy R&D industries. 
Turning in Table 4 to the sample of 7 industries with data from 1973-1998, we find 
similar results.  Because of the larger amount of energy R&D performed during the 1970s, here 
we use 5% and 10% as cutoffs for energy R&D intensity, as none of the industries in this sample 
spend less than one percent of R&D on energy research.  Once again, in low energy R&D 
industries, there is no measurable crowding out effect:  Moreover, the value of other coefficients, 
such as value added, is also consistent with expectations.  In high energy R&D industries, we 
again get a negative effect on total energy R&D.  Here, omitting petroleum extraction and 
refining does not change the result.  Also as before, the results do not change when the three-year 
lag of the dependent variable is used as an additional instrument.  
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The results of these regressions suggest that, during past spikes in energy research 
activity, research funding did not flow from non-energy R&D sectors to sectors performing 
R&D.  While the results raise the possibility of crowding out within these energy R&D sectors – 
that is, that new energy R&D in these sectors comes at the expense of other R&D in these 
sectors, these results appear less certain.  For example, the conclusions about crowding out in 
these sectors do not change as the cutoff used to define high energy R&D sectors changes.  This 
poses problems for interpretation.  Consider the chemical industry, which spends 3.2% of its 
R&D on energy-related research.  Using the one percent cutoff in table 3 would suggest that the 
chemical industry experiences crowding out when energy research increases.  However, using a 
five percent cutoff would suggest that it does not.   
A final concern with the regressions for high energy R&D industries is that all energy 
R&D spending does not go to a single industry.  For example, if one new dollar of energy R&D 
is equally shared among four industries, the appropriate test for crowding out would be whether 
the coefficient on energy R&D equals 0.25.  Using the average share of energy R&D assigned to 
industry i for years for which industry-level energy R&D data are available, we find that this 
ranges from 1.5% for primary metals to 27% for petroleum refining.  Thus, while we reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient on energy R&D is 1 in these models, in most cases we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is 0.27 – that is, that 27% of the total energy R&D 
is going to industry i.   
Given this concern, Table 5 presents one additional set of regressions for high-energy 
R&D industries.  Here, we replace the economy-wide level of energy R&D with an estimated 
value for each industry, found by multiplying the economy-wide energy R&D data by the 
average share of energy R&D going to that industry from years in which industry-specific data  
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are available.  These results are suggestive of crowding out, but are very imprecise.
7  Here, the 
null hypothesis of no crowding out again implies that the coefficient on energy R&D be one – 
that all new energy R&D is new R&D.  Except for the 1983-1997 data without refineries, we 
reject this null hypothesis.  However, the negative signs on these coefficients are troubling 
(although not significant), as are the large magnitudes.  At best, we can only say that the results 
for industries that perform energy R&D are ambiguous, and await better data.  Given this 
ambiguity, we turn next to firm-level patent data, to take a closer look at the changes occurring 
within firms as energy R&D increases. 
 
II. Crowding Out Within Sectors 
To address the question of crowding out within sectors, we look at the research decisions 
made by individual firms.  In principle, we would like to know if increases in energy R&D at the 
firm level crowd out other types of R&D.  Unfortunately, R&D data are not available at the firm 
level with this level of detail.  Instead, we use patents as a proxy for energy and other R&D.
8  
Using patent data, we classify firm research outcomes as energy-related or not.  We then ask 
whether increases in energy-related research lead to decreases in other research.   
Our model specification is purposely sparse.  Define OPATi,t as non-energy patents 
assigned to firm i, with an application year of t.  Similarly, EPATi,t represents energy patents 
from these same firms.  Xi,t represents a vector of firm-specific control variables, such as capital, 
sales, or debt, to control for firm size.  We estimate an equation of the form: 
                                                 
7 Table 5 is equivalent to panel A of Tables 3 and 4.  Results do not change when using R&Di,t-3 as an instrument, 
except for the case without refineries between 1973-1997.  However, for that case, Hansen’s J test shows that the 
instruments are invalid.  Results are available from the authors upon request. 
8 Griliches (1990) shows that patents, sorted by their year of application, are strongly correlated with R&D 
expenditures, and thus make a good proxy for R&D spending.  For a discussion of other applications of patent data 
in environmental economics, see Popp (2005).  
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(2)  OPATi,t = f(OPATi,t-1, EPATi,t, Xi,t, ai, bt), 
where ai and bt represent firm and year fixed-effects.  Note that because we are using patents as a 
proxy for R&D spending, we do not include R&D spending as a control variable.  While one 
would expect increases in R&D to increase patenting activity, it does not allow us to determine 
whether one type of R&D has replaced the other.  We include year effects to allow for changes 
in patent policy that change the propensity to patent among all inventors, and to control for 
truncation problems in the last years of our data.  Because not all patent applications are made 
public, we obtain the application years of our patents from the final granted patent publication.  
We have data on patents granted through 2002.  Since some patent applications filed in the late 
1990s and early 2000s would still have been pending in 2002, counts of patent applications in 
these years will be too low.  As such, we restrict our analysis to patent applications filed between 
1970 and 1999.  Year dummies correct for any remaining truncation problem. 
 
A. Data 
We examine data for two types of energy innovations.  First, we look at patents aimed at 
new energy technologies.  These include renewable technologies such as wind and solar power, 
as well as new sources that may use fossil fuels, such as fuel cells and coal liquefaction.  This 
sample includes firms from a broad cross-section of industries.  To focus more closely on a 
specific industry, we also look at new technologies in the automotive sector.  Here, we include 
fuel cells and hybrid vehicles, as well as innovations designed to improve the fuel economy of 
internal combustion engines. 
Our patent data comes from two sources.  First, we identify relevant energy patents using 
the Delphion patent database, using a combination of patent classification codes and, in the case  
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of energy efficiency patents, appropriate keywords.
9  Appendix A shows the technologies 
included in our paper, along with the relevant search strategies for each.  To identify all patents 
granted to firms working in these fields, we use the NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe, & 
Trajtenberg, 2001).  Based on the firm information available in the NBER database, this leaves 
us with a sample of patents granted from 1971-2002.
10  
From this, we calculated the total number of patents granted to each firm in our sample, 
along with the number of energy patents.  We eliminated firms where nearly all patents are 
energy patents, such as International Fuel Cells or Ballard Power Systems (a fuel cell 
manufacturer).
11  We also eliminated firms with less than 1.5% of their patents in one of our 
energy categories.  This eliminates large, diversified firms such as General Electric and some 
chemical companies.  In both cases, the percentage of energy patents is so small that one would 
not expect to identify any reasonable relationship between energy and other patents.  For the 
remaining firms, we searched Compustat to identify firm-specific variables.  Our firm-specific 
variables, all measured in billions of 2000 dollars, are capital (Compustat item #8: Property, 
Plant, and Equipment – Total (Net)), net sales (Compustat item #18), and debt (Compustat item 
#9).  Using only firms with greater than 1.5% of their patents in either technology area, this 
leaves us with a sample of 13 firms for automotive technology and 31 firms for alternative 
energy.  Table 6 displays, by firm, average values for each of the variables in our dataset. 
To get a sense of who patents in these technology areas, Tables 7 and 8 present the top 
patent assignees by field.  Table 7 lists the top 20 assignees for each field.  Note that these two 
                                                 
9 Available at www.delphion.com.  
10 The NBER database limits us to patents granted from 1968, as firm identifiers are not available before that date.  
Similarly, the NBER data currently ends in 2002.  However, we only use patents granted from 1971 because the 
Delphion database only includes abstracts for keyword searching on patents beginning in 1971. 
11 Our initial cutoff for this was firms with more than 2/3 of their patents pertaining to energy.  However, once we 
search for financial data on the remaining firms, no firm with more than 29% of their patents pertaining to energy 
remain in the dataset.   
 
14
lists are dominated by large firms with just a few percent of their total patents falling in these 
categories.  Only a few predominately energy companies, such as Ballard Power Systems and 
International Fuel Cells Corporation, appear in the top 20.  For each technology area, Table 8 
lists the top 20 firms having the greatest percentage of their patents falling in one of these 
categories.  Here, we only include firms with 10 or more patents in these areas, as there are 
hundreds of firms that have only one relevant energy patent and no other patents.  There are 
many companies specializing in the alternative energy field, as relevant energy patents comprise 
70% or more of the total patent portfolio for each of the firms in the top 20.  In contrast, the top 
20 automotive energy firms include companies for which energy patents comprise just 16% or 
more of their patent portfolio.   
In both cases, the distribution of assignees is highly skewed.  Not counting patents 
assigned to individuals, there are 3,059 unique patent assignees in the alternative energy field. Of 
these, 1,935 have just one alternative energy patent.  Only 17% of alternative energy patents are 
assigned to the top 20 assignees (not counting individually assigned patents).  There are 18,107 
total patents in this field.  The companies included in our regression have 2,011 of these, or 11 
percent.  For these 32 firms, energy patents represent 3.6 percent of their total patenting activity.  
For automotive technologies, there are 1,438 unique patent assignees for 9,895 total patents.  Of 
these, 813 have just one automotive energy patent.  Larger firms play a more important role here, 
as 32 percent of patents are assigned to the top 20 assignees (again, not counting individually 
assigned patents).  The companies included in our regression have 1,269 of these, or 13 percent.  
Energy patents represent 3.9 percent of total patenting activity for these 14 firms. 
Finally, Figures 2 and 3 show energy and non-energy patents for the firms in our 
alternative energy and automotive energy regressions, respectively.  In each, patents are sorted  
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by the year of application.  The number of energy patent applications per year is on the left y-
axis, and the number of non-energy patent applications per year is on the right y- axis.  Note that 
alternative energy patents increase during the energy crises of the 1970s.  Afterwards, energy 
patents decline, and non-energy patents increase, suggesting possible crowding out.  For 
automotive energy patents, the bulk of applications occur more recently, as a result of research 
on fuel cell and hybrid vehicles.  Until this recent spike, both energy and non-energy patents 
tended to move together.  The figure suggests crowding out may occur at the end of the sample. 
 
B. Results 
Tables 9 through 12 present results for alternative energy patents and automotive energy 
patents, respectively.  In each case, the null hypothesis is that energy patents do not crowd out 
other patents, which we fail to reject unless the coefficient on energy patents is significantly 
different from zero.  Tables 9 and 11 include six specifications – three including year dummies, 
and three that replace the year dummies with a time trend.  Using the time trend provides 
additional degrees of freedom, and allows us to use energy prices as an additional instrument for 
energy patents.  However, the trend may fail to capture discrete changes in patent policy, nor any 
remaining truncation bias in our data.  To allow for the possibility of gradual adjustments, we 
present specifications with a lagged dependent variable.  In these models, both the lagged 
dependent variable and energy patents are endogenous.  We use the first two lagged values of the 
exogenous dependent variables (sales, debt, and capital, as well as the time dummies or trend) as 
instruments, along with second-year lagged values of energy patents.  In addition, we use current 
and lagged energy prices as instruments in the model using a time trend.  Tables 10 and 12 
present additional sensitivity analysis to assess the validity of our instruments.  All regressions  
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use GMM estimation with firm fixed effects.  Standard errors are corrected for both 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.   
We look first at the results for alternative energy technologies.  The first three columns of 
Table 9 present results of the model with year dummies, and the last three present results of the 
model with a time trend.  The evidence for crowding out is mixed.  In each model, the coefficient 
on energy patents is negative, and slightly larger than 1, suggesting that a new energy patent 
fully crowds out a non-energy patent.  However, these coefficients are only significant in column 
(1), which uses year dummies and a full set of controls.  As expected the effect of sales is 
positive, but is not significant in the model including capital and debt.
12  The effect of capital and 
debt is insignificant.  Lagged other patents has a positive coefficient less than one, suggesting a 
gradual adjustment process.   
The positive effect of sales on patenting is also suggestive of crowding out.  Crowding 
out is most likely to occur when firms face financial constraints, so that they are unable to take 
advantage of all profitable research opportunities.  In the existing literature on R&D financing, 
tests of financial constraints are indirect (see, for example, Hall 2002).  Intuition about these tests 
can be gained by considering what firms choose to do with new cash flow.  If firms choose to 
invest new cash flow in additional R&D, this suggests that the firm faced research opportunities 
that it had not taken advantage of due to financial constraints.  That increased revenues from 
sales leads to more patenting suggests that these alternative energy firms may face R&D 
financing constraints.
13 
                                                 
12 The model uses lagged sales, on the assumption that increased revenues from new sales are used to fund R&D in 
the following year. 
13 We choose not to overemphasize this result, as the ideal measure of cash flow would be net profits.  In results not 
reported here, we found net profits to consistently have an insignificant effect on other patenting.  As these results 
also magnify the weak instruments problem noted below, we omit profits from the models in this paper.   
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Unfortunately, regression diagnostics suggest that our instrumental variables may not be 
sufficient.  The fit of the model is generally good, with R
2 statistics near 0.6.  As shown by the p-
value from Hansen’s J statistic presented below the estimates, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  However, the Wald F statistic based on the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is less than the “rule of thumb” of 10, suggesting weak instruments 
(Staiger and Stock, 1997; Baum et al., 2007). 
Further exploration suggests that the weak instruments problem comes from the lagged 
dependent variable.  For instance, in column (1), the F-statistic for the first-stage equation for 
lagged other patents is just 2.69, where as it is 13.03 for the first-stage equation for energy 
patents.  Given this, Table 10 shows results from two additional specifications.
14  F i r s t ,  i n  
columns (2) and (5) we use 3-year lagged Other Patents as an additional instrument.  While one 
might expect this to be endogenous, particularly if the adjustment process is slow, we still do not 
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid using Hansen’s J-statistic.  As would be 
expected, the F-statistic for our instruments now improves substantially.  Most importantly, this 
does not change our crowding out result, which is still significant when using a complete set of 
year dummies.  The magnitude of the adjustment parameter falls slightly, but is still significant.  
Moreover, with better instruments, the effect of sales is now significant in both columns (2) and 
(5).  Finally, columns (3) and (6) present results of a model that excludes the lagged dependent 
variable.  As expected, the F-statistic now suggests that our instruments for energy patents are 
sufficient.  However, our estimates are slightly less precise, and the R
2 statistics are much lower 
without the lagged dependent variable.  Moreover, while the coefficient on energy patents is still 
                                                 
14 To conserve space, we focus on the model with all three controls for firm characteristics.   
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negative, it is now insignificant.  Given the strong significance of the lagged dependent variable, 
dropping it from the model provides unsatisfactory results. 
The results for automotive energy technologies (Table 11) are less satisfying.  As noted 
in the previous section, there are fewer firms in this dataset, leaving us with only 254 
observations, compared to 608 for the alternative energy regressions.  As a result, although the 
signs of our estimated coefficients are as expected, only capital is statistically significant at even 
the 10 percent level.
15  As before, we have a weak instruments problem.  Moreover, the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic (2006) suggests that the model is unidentified except when sales are 
the only dependent variable.  As shown in Table 12, using the three-year lag of the dependent 
variable partially addresses the weak instruments problem, although the F-statistic for the 
instruments is still less than 10.  However, the improved fit of the first stage regressions results 
in statistical significance for both capital and the lagged dependent variable.  As before, dropping 
the lagged dependent variable completely leads to less satisfactory results.  Overall, crowding 
out seems to be less of a problem for the automotive industry.  While this may be due to the 
larger size of these firms, given our smaller sample size, we have less confidence in this result 
than for our results using alternative energy patents.   
 
C. What is Crowded Out? 
Given the evidence of crowding out from alternative energy innovations, we take a closer 
look at innovations in a subset of our sample to see what might be lost when alternative energy 
innovation increases.  To be able to categorize these other patents in greater detail, we limit our 
                                                 
15 Following the discussion of financial constraints above, it is somewhat comforting that both energy patents and 
sales have no effect on other patents.  Also, the automotive firms in our sample are larger than the alternative energy 
firms, with an average value of capital two billion dollars higher, and average assets that are more than double those 
of the alternative energy firms.  One would expect larger firms to be less likely to face financial constraints, and thus 
less likely to suffer from crowding out of R&D resources.  
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focus to the 12 firms from our alternative energy sample that are energy refinery companies.
16  
Using patent classifications, we categorize all of the patents from these 12 firms into one of 7 
technology groups: alternative energy, coal-based fuels, environmental, refining, chemistry, 
drilling wells, and other technologies.  Alternative energy patents include traditional renewable 
sources such as wind, solar, and geothermal. Coal-based fuels include coal gasification and coal 
liquefaction patents.  In the regression analysis of the previous section, both of these are 
categorized as alternative energy patents.  Among the refineries, these coal-based fuels are an 
important component of alternative energy innovation, comprising two-third of the alternative 
energy patents for these firms.  Thus, we consider these separately from other alternative energy 
patents.  Environmental patents pertain to pollution control, and include techniques for cleaning 
up oil spills, as well as isomerization refining techniques developed as part of the phase-out of 
lead from gasoline and reformulated fuels.  Appendix B presents a complete list of the patent 
classifications in each technology group.  Figure 4 shows trends in these seven groups over time. 
Table 13 shows the correlation between patent applications per year in each category.
17  
Because overall patent counts move together over time (for instance, as a result of changing firm 
revenues), we look at both correlations between counts of patents in each group, as well as 
correlations between the percentage of each year’s patents belonging to each group.  Using raw 
patent counts, all correlations are positive. However, the two smallest correlations are between 
alternative energy and refining, and coal-based fuels and refining.  The correlations between 
either alternative fuels or coal-based fuels and environmental patents are also small.  Using 
correlations between the percentage of patents in each category per year, we now see several 
negative correlations.  This is expected, since the sum of percentages in each year must sum to 
                                                 
16 These firms are Amoco, Atlantic Richfield, Chevron, Conoco, ExxonMobil, Gulf, Kerr-McGee, Mobil, 
Occidental, Standard Oil, Texaco, and Tosco. 
17 We use patents from 1973-1999, as these are the years appearing in the regression analysis.  
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100.  Here, the correlation between alternative energy patents and refining patents is strongly 
negative, at -0.70.  The same holds true for the correlation between coal-based fuels and refining.  
The correlation between alternative energy and pollution control innovations is also negative, but 
its magnitude is much smaller, at -0.39.  Finally, to focus on the period where crowding out is 
most likely, panels C and D of Table 13 repeat the analysis for only those patents from 1973-
1987.  As shown in Figure 4, this covers the period in which alternative energy innovation 
increased and then returned to pre-energy crisis levels.  While refinery patents still are most 
likely to be crowded out, we also see evidence of crowding out for patents pertaining to drilling 
wells.  The correlation between the number of alternative energy patents and wells patents is 
0.30, and the correlation between the percentages of these patents is -0.65.  While only 
suggestive, these correlations provide evidence that much of what is crowded out from increased 
alternative energy research are innovations on refining and drilling wells, both of which would 
increase production of fossil fuels.  Thus, while it is important for such crowding out to be 
accounted for in integrated assessment models, these results also suggest that one effect of 
policies designed to increase alternative energy R&D is to lower incentives for R&D on 
traditional fossil fuel energy sources. 
 
III. The Social Value of Energy Innovations 
While the analysis of the preceding section provides some evidence as to the types of 
research that are crowded out, it does not tell us anything about the social value of this research.  
Economists consistently find that the social returns to research are higher than a firm’s private 
returns.
18  This deviation results from knowledge spillovers due to the public-good nature of new 
                                                 




knowledge.  A successful innovator will capture some rewards, but those rewards will always be 
only a fraction—and sometimes a very small fraction—of the overall benefits to society of the 
innovation.  Hence innovation creates positive externalities in the form of knowledge spillovers 
for other firms and consumers. 
If the social returns to new alternative energy R&D are no different from the social 
returns to the R&D that is crowded out, then simply measuring the magnitude of crowding out is 
sufficient. However, if these social returns differ, the ultimate economic effect of crowding out 
will be miscalculated unless these differences are accounted for.  A priori, there are two reasons 
to expect that alternative energy research may have a greater social value than other research.  
First, comparatively less research has been done on alternative energy than other fields, 
particularly at the beginning of our sample.  As a result, alternative energy starts from a lower 
knowledge base, leading to greater opportunities for big breakthroughs and positive spillovers 
than more mature technologies. Second, energy technologies may have influence in many 
sectors, raising the possibility that innovations will have the characteristics of General Purpose 
Technologies (GPT) (see, for example, Helpman, 1998). 
We use two measures of social value.  Both make use of patent citation data.  Many 
researchers have used patent citations as an indicator of the value of a patent.
19  F i r s t ,  w e  
consider the number of patent citations received by each patent in our sample.  We assume more 
frequently cited patents have more value to society, as they provide the building blocks to a 
larger number of future innovations.  Second, we use a measure of patent generality described in 
Hall et al. (2001).  Generality asks whether a patent is cited by other patents from many different 
technological fields, or just by other similar patents.  The index ranges from 0-1, with higher 
                                                 




values representing more general patents.  More formally, generality is a Herfindahl index 
defined as  
(3)  ∑ − =
i n
j
ij i s Generality
2 1 
where sij denotes the percentage of citations received by patent i from patents in patent class j, 
out of a total of ni patent classes.  Our assumption is that more general patents provide more 
social value, as they provide building blocks to innovations in more sectors of the economy. 
Our analysis makes use of the patents from the previous section.  Citation data come from 
the NBER patent database, which includes all citations made by patents granted between 1975 
and 2002.  Based on this, we restrict our analysis to patents with application years between 1975-
1999.  Table 14 provides descriptive data on generality and citations received by both energy and 
non-energy patents in our database.  In addition, a more detailed breakdown is provided for the 
seven technology groups introduced for refineries in the previous section.  The descriptive data 
suggests that alternative energy patents are cited more frequently, and are more general, than 
other patents.   
However, simply looking at descriptive data does not tell the whole story, as citation 
patterns vary over time, as well as across technologies.  For example, the number of 
opportunities to be cited is important.  Patents are likely to receive more citations if there are 
more patents in the years immediately following publication.  Moreover, older patents, such as 
the bulk of alternative energy patents, have had more chances to be cited than more recent 
patents.  In addition, more recently granted patents are more likely to cite previous patents, as a 
result of both computerized data bases making searching for relevant patents easier, as well as 
increasing legal pressure to include all relevant citations in the final patent.  Regression analysis  
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allows us to control for such features, using fixed effects for patent application year to control for 
the number of citing opportunities that follow. 
For both citations and generality, our regression takes the following form.  Define yi as 
the variable of interest – either the subsequent citations received by patent i, or the generality 
index of patent i.  Dummy variables indicate whether or not the patent is assigned to a firm from 
our alternative energy sample or our automotive sample, and whether or not the patent is an 
alternative energy or automotive energy patent.  For non-energy patents, we also include a 
dummy variable for the general technology type, based on the classification system used in the 
NBER patent database. This accounts for the general finding that some fields are more active 
than others, and thus more likely to receive citations.  Our regression becomes: 
(4)  yi = f(Alternative Energy Dummy, Automotive Energy Dummy, Alternative Energy Firm 
Dummy, Technology Dummy, year fixed effects)  
As many patents are never cited, we use a generalized negative binomial regression for the 
citation analysis, allowing the overdispersion parameter to differ for automotive and alternative 
energy firms.  Results are reported as e
β, so that they can be interpreted as the likelihood of 
citation relative to a base case patent, a non-energy patent belonging to an automotive firm.  
Because generality is bounded by 0 and 1, we use a Tobit regression to examine whether energy 
patents are more general than other patents assigned to the firms in our sample.  We do a similar 
analysis of refinery patents, using only dummies for the seven technology groups and year fixed 
effects.  Because refinery patents are most likely to be crowded out, they are the excluded 
category. 
Table 15 presents our results.  Panel A confirms that both alternative energy patents and 
automotive energy patents are more likely to be cited than other patents from these firms.    
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Interestingly, the social value of all patents from the energy companies is higher, as patents from 
these firms are 88 percent more likely to be cited than those from automotive firms.  Alternative 
energy patents from these firms an additional 15 percent more likely to be cited.  Automotive 
energy patents are 53 percent more likely to be cited than non-energy patents from these firms.  
Similarly, as shown in the last column, both alternative energy patents and automotive energy 
patents are more general than other patents from these firms. 
Panel B shows the results using only patents from the 12 energy refineries, allowing us to 
compare the value of alternative energy patents to those most likely to be crowded out.  Our 
excluded category is refining patents.  While alternative energy patents are more general than 
refining patents, suggesting that they do impact more areas of the economy than the innovations 
they replace, their social value is not much higher.  These patents are 7 percent more likely to be 
cited, but the result is not statistically significant.  Thus, while the crowding out effect within the 
refining sector appears to have a positive environmental effect, by crowding out research 
designed to enhance the production of fossil fuels, the value of these innovations to future 
researchers is no different than the value of the research that is crowded out.  
 
IV. Discussion 
As calls for increased energy R&D strengthen, it is important to know where funding for 
these efforts will come from.  In particular, to the extent that new energy R&D funding crowds 
out other R&D efforts, the social benefits to new energy R&D will be dampened.  Using both 
industry and firm-level data from the United States, this paper takes a first look at the source of 
energy R&D.  Using industry data, we find little evidence of crowding out across sectors.  
Economy wide increases in energy R&D do not appear to draw R&D resources away from those  
 
25
industries that are not actively involved in energy research, mitigating the concern that new 
energy R&D programs will draw resources away from other innovative sectors of the economy. 
Looking within sectors that do perform significant energy R&D, the results are mixed.  
Industry-level regressions suggest that within-sector crowding out may be an issue, as increases 
in energy R&D within these industries do not appear to be associated with equivalent increases 
in overall R&D within these industries. While better data are needed to substantiate this claim, 
the results raise the possibility that firms in these industries move R&D resources from other 
areas to support increases in energy R&D.  Data limitations make the results difficult to interpret, 
however, particularly for firms performing moderate levels of energy R&D.  One particular 
concern is that our energy R&D variable measures economy-wide energy R&D levels, rather 
than industry-specific levels.   
Because of these concerns, we use firm-level patent data to take a closer look at two 
types of energy research.  Since we combine these patent data with financial data from 
Compustat, our sample is restricted to large, publicly traded firms.  Within these firms, we find 
evidence of crowding out among companies working on alternative energy technologies – 
increases in the number of energy patents assigned to a firm do lead to decreases in other types 
of patents by these firms – but not for companies working on automotive technologies.  Using 
more detailed patent data on refinery companies, we find that alternative energy research most 
likely crowded out innovations on refining and wells.  This is consistent with the notion that any 
apparent crowding out reacts to market incentives – as opportunities for alternative energy 
research become more profitable, we would expect research opportunities for traditional fossil 
fuels to appear less appealing to firms.  Given that the broader sample of energy firms does 
appear to face some financing constraints (as shown by the positive effect of sales on patents),  
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we cannot conclude that the observed crowding out is only a result of firms moving resources 
from less profitable to more profitable ventures.  However, it does suggest that any crowding out 
which occurred in this industry had a positive environmental effect, by enhancing greener 
technologies at the expense of dirtier ones. 
Finally, we use patent citation data to compare the social value of energy research to 
other research by these firms.  We find that energy patents are cited more frequently, suggesting 
that they provide greater value to future inventors.  They are also more general as they are cited 
by a larger range of other patents than non-energy innovations.  This is consistent with the notion 
that energy innovations can have a broad impact on the economy, because of the importance of 
energy use throughout the economy.  However, confining our analysis to refineries, we find no 
difference in the social value of alternative energy patents compared to the refining and wells 
patents most likely to be crowded out by alternative energy research. 
Our results have implications both for policy and for integrated assessment modelers.  
For policy, a key result is that any crowding out that may occur appears to affect dirty 
technologies.  Thus, policies enhancing research incentives for green technologies have the 
additional desired effect of reducing incentives for research on dirty technologies such as fossil 
fuels.  To illustrate the importance of this, consider the results of Gerlagh (2008), who presents a 
climate model allowing for a choice of carbon-energy producing R&D, carbon-energy saving 
R&D, and neutral R&D.  Gerlagh simulates the effect of a carbon tax on his model, and finds 
that carbon-producing R&D, rather than neutral R&D, is crowded out by induced carbon-energy 
saving R&D.  As a result, the impact of induced technological change is larger than in other 
models with crowding out, with optimal carbon taxes falling by a factor of 2.    
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For integrated assessment modelers, the results highlight the importance of incorporating 
the costs of R&D in the model.  Many integrated assessment models include detailed 
descriptions of alternative energy research, but treat other forms of technological change as 
exogenous.  As this exogenous technological change includes research that may decline when 
alternative energy research increases, not adjusting this exogenous rate will double-count gains 
from induced technological change, even if the decrease in research results from profit-
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 std dev 
R&D    mean VA 








Petroleum refining and extraction  2,429.25   376.04   135,536.20  33,348.48 1.9% 51.4% 
Electrical equipment  13,196.52  4,150.16   125,681.77  26,125.15  10.4%  8.7% 
Nonmanufacturing 15,788.65  11,779.22 487,836.17  84,824.31  2.9%  8.4% 
Primary metals  817.09   128.02   49,976.08   6,619.26    1.7%  7.1% 
Transportation equipment  16,727.32  3,301.58   132,206.80  21,309.51 12.6%  5.9% 
Fabricated metal products  974.87   246.80   80,014.54  11,812.58  1.2%  3.5% 
Chemicals and allied products  13,944.62  4,127.69   117,557.85  30,869.13 11.8%  3.2% 
Lumber, wood products, and furniture  250.10   113.62   53,943.03   9,914.92   0.5%  2.4% 
Rubber products  1,077.57   260.80   39,516.49   8,706.95    2.7%  2.1% 
Machinery 12,970.96  3,099.84    128,507.71 15,149.11  10.1%  2.0% 
Stone, clay, and glass products  734.05   253.28   30,349.00   4,903.97   2.5%  1.9% 
Other manufacturing industries  855.52  684.55    103,745.37  18,819.92 0.8%  0.7% 
Professional and scientific instruments  6,974.03   1,639.46   44,042.07  11,333.53 16.1%  0.6% 
Paper and allied products  1,082.87   329.40   48,453.50   8,702.04   2.2%  0.4% 
Food, kindred, and tobacco products  1,460.15   239.14   118,867.46  17,700.17 1.2%  0.3% 
Textiles and apparel   300.20   86.53    53,845.03  4,486.15   0.6%  0.2% 
  all industries w/energy R&D > 5% of R&D   9,791.77   8,856.97  186,247.41 160,707.60  5.9%   
  all industries w/energy R&D < 5% of R&D   3,693.18   5,206.13   74,440.19   37,667.08  4.5%    
NOTE: all dollar values are in 2000 dollars. Industries sorted by % of R&D devoted to energy R&D.  
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 std dev 
R&D    mean VA 








Petroleum refining and extraction   2,163.25 494.11    121,537.37    37,845.35 1.9%  56.3% 
Nonmanufacturing 10,706.81  11,813.35 443,782.35   92,503.91  2.0%  16.1% 
Electrical equipment  11,096.76   4,448.64 108,781.24   31,859.27 10.0%  12.5% 
Primary metals  856.10   121.64    57,170.03   11,784.00  1.5%  7.7% 
Chemicals and allied products  11,166.28   5,108.05  102,408.95   32,669.41 10.5%  3.8% 
Fabricated metal products  889.23   233.30    76,250.66   11,096.48 1.2%  3.5% 
Machinery 10,806.75    3,938.94  121,354.62   16,594.16  8.8%  1.7% 
 all industries w/energy R&D > 5% of R&D   6,205.73   7,825.66  182,817.75 161,902.20  3.9%   
 all industries w/energy R&D < 5% of R&D   7,620.75   6,041.47  100,004.74   28,675.73  6.8%    




Table 3 – Industry-level Crowding Out Results, 1983-1997 
 
A. Base results 
   low energy R&D    high energy R&D 
no refineries 
Variable  < 1%  < 5%  > 1%  > 5%  > 1%  > 5% 
R&D(i,t-1) 0.7498  0.9724  0.8966 0.9332  0.9605 0.9562 
(0.2201) (0.0827) (0.1016) (0.1137) (0.0898)  (0.1198) 
energy R&D(i,t)  -0.0576  0.0014 0.0744  -0.0251 0.2010  0.1986 
(0.1213) (0.0585) (0.1052) (0.1932) (0.1212)  (0.1992) 
Value Added(i,t-1)  0.0054  -0.0005 0.0168  0.0125  0.0132  0.0139 
(0.0036) (0.0074) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0117)  (0.0149) 
Federal R&D(t-1)  -0.0058  -0.0061  -0.0264 -0.0432  -0.0324 -0.0618 
   (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0128)  (0.0235) (0.0137)  (0.0345) 
N 75  165  165  75  150  60 
r2 0.885  0.712  0.919  0.948  0.916  0.949 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.689  0.156 0.522  0.970 0.509  0.983 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  0.395 1.540  1.833 2.093  3.219 3.035 
underidentification test p-value  0.799  0.149   0.127  0.256    0.012  0.082 
Dependent variable is all company-financed R&D performed in industry i at time t.  Lagged R&D and energy R&D 
treated as endogenous.  Instruments are Value Added(i,t-2), Federal R&D(t-2), energy R&D(t-2), energy prices(t), 
gross domestic product(t), defense spending(t), and federal energy R&D spending(t-1).  Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
B. Including 3-year lagged R&D as an instrument 
   low energy R&D    high energy R&D 
no refineries 
Variable  < 1%  < 5%  > 1%  > 5%  > 1%  > 5% 
R&D(i,t-1) 0.9216  0.8561  0.7207 0.7038  0.7871 0.7182 
(0.0731) (0.1227) (0.1065) (0.1189) (0.1179)  (0.1309) 
energy R&D(i,t)  0.0515  0.0361  0.0103 -0.3046  0.3065 0.2279 
(0.0316) (0.1113) (0.1664) (0.2641) (0.1631)  (0.1837) 
Value Added(i,t-1)  0.0047  0.0092 0.0336  0.0361 0.0332  0.0438 
(0.0033) (0.0118) (0.0131) (0.0139) (0.0167)  (0.0172) 
Federal R&D(t-1)  -0.0086  -0.0159  -0.0332 -0.0619  -0.0532 -0.1189 
   (0.0037) (0.0110) (0.0199)  (0.0349) (0.0188)  (0.0325) 
N 70  154  154  70  140  56 
r2 0.872  0.685  0.905  0.940  0.913  0.949 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.293  0.487 0.517  0.827 0.052  0.188 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  13.420 12.486  10.708  7.194  7.184  5.015 
underidentification test p-value  0.062  0.001   0.002  0.017    0.005  0.082 
Dependent variable is all company-financed R&D performed in industry i at time t.  Lagged R&D and energy R&D 
treated as endogenous.  Instruments are R&D(i,t-3),  Value Added(i,t-2), Federal R&D(t-2), energy R&D(t-2), 
energy prices(t), gross domestic product(t), defense spending(t), and federal energy R&D spending(t-1).  Standard 
errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4 – Industry-level Crowding Out Results, 1973-1997 
 
A. Base results 
   low energy R&D    high energy R&D 
no refineries 
Variable  < 5%  < 10%  > 5%  > 10%  > 5%  > 10% 
R&D(i,t-1) 0.9081  0.9291  0.8364 0.7939  1.0558 1.0314 
(0.0896) (0.0676) (0.1067) (0.1267) (0.0690)  (0.0899) 
energy R&D(i,t)  0.1630  0.1053  -0.4168 -0.6402  -0.0244 0.0830 
(0.1783) (0.1074) (0.2027) (0.3126) (0.1368)  (0.2725) 
Value Added(i,t-1)  0.0170  0.0103 0.0221  0.0261 0.0042  0.0083 
(0.0139) (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0116) (0.0071)  (0.0100) 
Federal R&D(t-1)  0.0198  0.0188  -0.0129 -0.0356  0.0119 -0.0039 
   (0.0165) (0.0127) (0.0150)  (0.0240) (0.0148)  (0.0290) 
N 69  92  92  69  69  46 
r2 0.894  0.891  0.969  0.969  0.969  0.970 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.082  0.047 0.638  0.752 0.104  0.103 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  4.922 4.450  1.001 0.869  3.876 4.140 
underidentification test p-value  0.004  0.003   0.578  0.675    0.021  0.031 
Dependent variable is all company-financed R&D performed in industry i at time t.  Lagged R&D and energy R&D 
treated as endogenous.  Instruments are Value Added(i,t-2), Federal R&D(t-2), energy R&D(t-2), energy prices(t), 
gross domestic product(t), defense spending(t), and federal energy R&D spending(t-1).  Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 
B. Including 3-year lagged R&D as an instrument 
   low energy R&D    high energy R&D 
no refineries 
Variable  < 1%  < 5%  > 1%  > 5%  > 1%  > 5% 
R&D(i,t-1) 0.8897  0.9154  0.7936 0.7369  0.9384 0.8366 
(0.1045) (0.0870) (0.0945) (0.1102) (0.1015)  (0.1188) 
energy R&D(i,t)  0.1438  0.0562  -0.5043 -0.7504  -0.3448 -0.7371 
(0.2170) (0.1320) (0.1637) (0.2390) (0.1661)  (0.2669) 
Value Added(i,t-1)  0.0204  0.0128 0.0255  0.0314 0.0132  0.0250 
(0.0165) (0.0118) (0.0096) (0.0118) (0.0113)  (0.0138) 
Federal R&D(t-1)  0.0203  0.0186  -0.0165 -0.0429  -0.0087 -0.0492 
   (0.0190) (0.0159) (0.0178)  (0.0291) (0.0216)  (0.0337) 
N 69  92  92  69  69  46 
r2 0.895  0.893  0.967  0.967  0.971  0.973 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.234  0.181 0.857  0.933 0.022  0.006 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  10.308 10.721  12.603  9.056  10.820  6.607 
underidentification test p-value  0.004  0.002   0.003  0.007    0.023  0.048 
Dependent variable is all company-financed R&D performed in industry i at time t.  Lagged R&D and energy R&D 
treated as endogenous.  Instruments are R&D(i,t-3),  Value Added(i,t-2), Federal R&D(t-2), energy R&D(t-2), 
energy prices(t), gross domestic product(t), defense spending(t), and federal energy R&D spending(t-1).  Standard 
errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5 – Industry-Level Crowding Out with Estimated Energy R&D 
 
   high energy R&D 1973-1997  high energy R&D 1983-1997 
no refineries  no refineries 
Variable  > 5%  > 10%  > 5%  > 10%  > 1%  > 5%  > 1%  > 5% 
R&D(i,t-1) 0.8335  0.8435  1.0587  1.0403  0.9525 0.9295  1.0062 0.9550 
(0.1113) (0.1107)  (0.0678) (0.0912)  (0.0832) (0.0936) (0.0870)  (0.1208) 
energy R&D(i,t)  -1.4906  -1.3663  0.2666 1.4106  -0.2777  -0.3585  2.9388 3.4952 
(0.8972) (0.8556)  (1.3385) (2.0013)  (0.4846) (0.5104) (2.8544)  (2.9155) 
Value Added(i,t-1)  0.0246  0.0247  0.0040 0.0081  0.0099 0.0129  0.0080 0.0151 
(0.0109) (0.0113)  (0.0069) (0.0100)  (0.0089) (0.0105) (0.0111)  (0.0150) 
Federal R&D(t-1)  -0.0182  -0.0387  0.0130  -0.0036  -0.0258 -0.0439  -0.0303 -0.0641 
   (0.0175)  (0.0264)  (0.0149) (0.0288)  (0.0119) (0.0234) (0.0140)  (0.0345) 
N  92 69  69 46  165  75  150  60 
r2  0.968 0.969  0.969 0.970  0.916 0.948  0.912 0.948 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.762  0.778  0.101 0.128  0.339 0.956  0.434 0.939 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  1.366  1.487  4.383 4.092  3.693 2.560  4.511 3.418 
underidentification test p-value  0.452  0.418    0.012 0.032  0.011 0.300    0.005 0.061 
The table presents results using estimated values for energy R&D for each industry, as described in the text.  Dependent variable is all company-
financed R&D performed in industry i at time t.  Lagged R&D and energy R&D treated as endogenous.  Instruments are Value Added(i,t-2), 
Federal R&D(t-2), energy R&D(t-2), energy prices(t), gross domestic product(t), defense spending(t), and federal energy R&D spending(t-1).  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Ametek, Inc.  30  0.53  6.27  9.39%  8.51%  0.15 0.70 0.10 
Amoco Corporation  28  2.21  0.50  90.36  2.47% 2.45% 0.58% 0.55% 20.67  27.98  3.27 
Atlantic Richfield   30  4.20  0.27  72.00  5.23% 5.83% 0.38% 0.37% 16.71  20.77  4.43 
Babcock & Wilcox  7  0.57  0.00  32.29  1.44% 1.77% 0.00% 0.00%  0.76 3.29 0.11 
Chevron 30  3.60  0.67  102.00  2.77%  3.53% 0.68% 0.65% 20.48 37.47  3.96 
Chrysler 28  2.04  65.39  3.37% 3.11% 8.75  33.39  4.90 
Cities Service Company  17  1.06  21.12  10.65%  5.01%  5.02 6.99 0.98 
Combustion Engineering  19  3.05  0.05  54.63 5.26% 5.59% 0.15% 0.10%  0.79 4.04 0.13 
Conoco 30  1.47  47.93  2.15% 3.06%  9.23  14.45  2.67 
Cummins Engine Co.  30  2.67  20.77  8.63%  12.84%  0.93  3.47  0.31 
Daimler-Benz   10  0.40  2.20  98.50  0.38% 0.41% 1.79% 2.23% 17.69 67.31  5.06 
Daimler-Chrysler   2  3.00  19.50  560.00  0.69% 0.54% 3.71% 3.48% 61.56 162.32 25.69 
Detroit Diesel  8  1.50  8.25  14.32%  18.18%  0.25 2.07 0.06 
Dorr-Oliver    9 0.89  8.33  10.34%  10.67%  0.02 0.30 0.00 
Energy Conversion Devices  30  3.07  0.27  13.10 14.33%  23.41% 2.65% 2.04%  0.01 0.02 0.00 
Engelhard Corporation  19  1.32  2.11  24.16  5.89% 5.45% 9.45% 8.71%  0.60 3.13 0.19 
Exxon   30  11.07  2.20  240.70  4.38%  4.60% 0.88% 0.91% 57.55 110.49  5.40 
Ford Motor Company  30  0.83  8.00  233.73  0.51% 0.36% 2.96% 3.42%  20.84 92.64 24.72 
Foster Wheeler  30  3.43  17.57  19.69%  19.54%  0.38 2.41 0.25 
Grumman Aerospace  24  0.83  29.25  4.77%  2.85%  0.40 3.39 0.32 
Gulf 12  5.08  0.00  79.50  6.13%  6.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05  0.04  0.02 
Honda 30  0.93  8.17  215.63  0.23%  0.43% 2.99% 3.79% 5.13  23.80  2.27 
Kerr-McGee  30  0.97 0.03 3.30  26.24%  29.29%  2.00%  1.01%  2.59 3.50 0.63 
Lubrizol 30  1.23  27.43  4.18%  4.50%  0.41 1.30 0.07 
 
(table continued on next page)  
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Mobil 29  4.59  3.31  224.86  1.89%  2.04% 1.40% 1.47% 24.40 60.91  4.37 
Molten  Metal  Technology  5 1.60  6.60  22.67%  24.24%  0.04 0.03 0.04 
Nissan 11  0.00  6.55  213.73  0.00%  0.00% 2.99% 3.06% 26.92 56.98 15.32 
Occidental 30  2.67  0.37  29.73  6.94% 8.97% 1.18% 1.23% 10.20 14.74  3.78 
Optical Coating Laboratory  30  0.37  4.50  9.13%  8.15%  0.05 0.11 0.02 
Owens-Illinois   30  1.23  65.53  1.34%  1.88%  2.29 4.89 1.84 
Praxair Technology  9  1.33  0.56  55.56  2.53% 2.40% 1.07% 1.00%  3.64 3.83 1.47 
Sanyo Electric  10  6.50  2.40  188.40  4.14% 3.45% 1.34% 1.27% 5.19  16.12  3.31 
Spire  Corp.  18  0.44 2.72  13.97%  16.33%  0.01 0.02 0.00 
Standard Oil  17  2.12  0.29  77.53  2.75%  2.73% 0.41% 0.38% 10.45 10.46  2.75 
Texaco 30  3.57  0.50  140.97  2.76%  2.53% 0.49% 0.35% 20.09 47.28  4.29 
Tosco Corporation  30  0.30  1.03  25.97%  29.03%  0.86 3.87 0.49 
Toyota 18  2.44  13.67  266.11  0.70%  0.92% 4.65% 5.14% 20.44 75.09 10.47 
United Technologies  30  6.13  5.47  178.30  3.58% 3.44% 3.16% 3.07% 3.31  18.20  1.27 
UOP 8  5.38  0.25  181.88  2.99%  2.96% 0.16% 0.14% 0.33  1.67  0.07 
Varian Associates  28  0.79  35.36  2.28%  2.22%  0.21 1.12 0.05 
Volvo 17  0.06  0.41  20.53  0.45%  0.29% 1.90% 2.01% 3.58  18.70  1.74 
Westinghouse Electric  22  6.82  4.82  423.96 1.70% 1.61% 1.21% 1.14% 3.28  13.83  0.63 
 
The table shows average values for variables, by firm. The columns labeled “pct energy (pct of total)” are the percentage of energy patents in the firms total 
patent portfolio (column3 or 4 divided by column 5).  Columns labeled “pct energy (average)” show the average of the annual share of energy patents for each 

















Individually Owned Patents  4457  521560  0.85% 
Exxon 340  7839  4.34% 
Canon 318  24454  1.30% 
US Department of Energy  303  6028  5.03% 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft  216  16024  1.35% 
United Technologies  201  5655  3.55% 
Westinghouse Electric  180  10891  1.65% 
International Fuel Cells Corporation  179  244  73.36% 
General Electric  147  27557  0.53% 
Mobil 137  6798  2.02% 
Atlantic Richfield Copmany  131  2323  5.64% 
Sanyo Electric  122  3047  4.00% 
Hitachi 116  24920  0.47% 
Texaco 115  4523  2.54% 
Chevron 111  3332  3.33% 
Foster Wheeler  106  565  18.76% 
NASA 106  4177  2.54% 
Mitsubishi 101  20951  0.48% 
Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.  94  429  21.91% 
Fuji Electric  91  1478  6.16% 
TOTAL (top 20 except individuals)  3114     













Individually Owned Patents  1624  521560  0.31% 
Ford Motor Company  345  7785  4.43% 
Toyota 335  7083  4.73% 
Honda 300  7243  4.14% 
Nissan 209  6947  3.01% 
International Fuel Cells Corporation  199  244  81.56% 
United Technologies Corporation  181  5655  3.20% 
General Motors  180  11408  1.58% 
Mitsubishi 159  20951  0.76% 
Hitachi 153  24920  0.61% 
General Electric  150  27557  0.54% 
Westinghouse Electric  138  10891  1.27% 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft  133  16024  0.83% 
Robert Bosch  108  9002  1.20% 
Mobil 98  6798  1.44% 
US Department of Energy  98  6028  1.63% 
Daimler-Chrysler 88  2196  4.01% 
Cummins Engine Company  85  682  12.46% 
Ballard Power Systems  84  90  93.33% 
NGK Insulators Ltd.  82  2597  3.16% 
TOTAL (top 20 except individuals)  3125     




Table 8 – Top Patent Assignees, by% of Patents Pertaining to Energy, by Field, 1971-2002 
 
 









JX Crystals, Inc.  23  23  100.00%
Solarco Corporation  12  12  100.00%
Sunworks, Inc.  12  12  100.00%
Magma Power Company  10  10  100.00%
H-Power Corp.  15  16  93.75% 
Electrochemische Energieconversie   12  13  92.31% 
Solarex Corporation  55  60  91.67% 
M-C Power Corporation  11  12  91.67% 
Chronar Corporation  24  27  88.89% 
Plug Power L.L.C.  53  60  88.33% 
Sovoncis Solar Systems  19  23  82.61% 
Spectrolab, Inc.  13  16  81.25% 
ZTek Corporation  13  16  81.25% 
Ballard Power Sytems, Inc.  73  90  81.11% 
Astropower, Inc.  12  15  80.00% 
AER Energy Resources, Inc.  38  49  77.55% 
United Solar Systems Corporation  33  44  75.00% 
International Fuel Cells Corp.  179  244  73.36% 
Evergreen Solar, Inc.  11  15  73.33% 
Photon Power, Inc.  16  23  69.57% 
TOTAL (top 20)  634     


















H-Power Corp.  16  16  100.00%
ZTek Corporation  16  16  100.00%
Ballard Power Systems, Inc.  84  90  93.33% 
Plug Power L.L.C.  54  60  90.00% 
M-C Power Corporation  10  12  83.33% 
International Fuel Cells Corp.  199  244  81.56% 
Phillips & Temro Industries, Inc.  11  16  68.75% 
Energy Research Corporation  58  91  63.74% 
National Power PLC  11  19  57.89% 
Xcellsis GmbH  17  31  54.84% 
Electric Fuel Limited  16  36  44.44% 
AER Energy Resources, Inc  18  49  36.73% 
Kabushikikaiha Equos Research  23  64  35.94% 
Lynntech, Inc.  21  61  34.43% 
Energy Development Associates  21  68  30.88% 
Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K.K.  19  77  24.68% 
Reveo, Inc.  19  77  24.68% 
SMH Management Services  10  53  18.87% 
Detroit Diesel Corporation  19  113  16.81% 
Ceramatec, Inc.  10  61  16.39% 
TOTAL (top 20)  652     
ALL ASSIGNEES  9895 2933721 0.34%  
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Table 9 – Crowding Out from Alternative Energy Patents 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Other Patents (t-1)  0.809  0.691 0.612 0.918 0.866 0.759 
(6.194) (3.829) (3.075) (6.264) (4.379) (3.495) 
Energy Patents(t)  -1.650  -1.486 -1.131 -1.234 -1.190 -0.925 
(-2.031) (-1.800) (-1.799) (-1.512) (-1.483) (-1.372) 
Sales  (t-1)  0.584 0.765 0.809 0.440 0.509 0.565 
(1.733) (1.970) (1.658) (1.276) (1.266) (1.151) 
Capital(t)  -0.776 -0.549  -0.819 -0.607 
(-1.617) (-1.029)  (-1.659) (-1.164) 
Debt(t) -0.022  0.704 
(-0.018) (0.546) 
trend -0.595  -0.622  -0.814 
(-2.302) (-1.891) (-2.470) 
Year Dummies  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO 
N  608 608 608 608 608 608 
r2  0.616 0.620 0.616 0.584 0.597 0.613 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.654  0.886 0.647 0.775 0.991 0.942 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  2.628 2.658 3.990 2.603 2.727 3.837 
underidentification test p-value  0.004 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.025 0.004 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Other Patents(t). T-statistics presented under estimates.  1 & 2 year lagged 
independent variables and 2-year lagged energy patents used as instruments for Other Patents(t-1) and Energy 
Patents.  Regressions run from 1973-1999, with lagged data back to 1970 used for instruments.  Energy prices 
and lagged energy prices also used as instruments in (4)-(6).  
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Table 10 – Crowding Out from Alternative Energy Patents – Additional Specifications 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Other Patents (t-1)  0.809  0.711  0.918  0.724 
(6.194) (10.639) (6.264) (10.236) 
Energy Patents(t)  -1.650  -1.618 -1.439 -1.234 -1.130 -1.440 
(-2.031) (-2.033) (-1.354) (-1.512) (-1.448) (-1.446)
Sales  (t-1)  0.584 0.753 1.994 0.440 0.697 1.811 
(1.733) (2.442) (5.164) (1.276) (2.218) (4.690) 
Capital(t) -0.776  -0.598  0.677 -0.819 -0.426 0.777 
(-1.617) (-1.293) (0.891) (-1.659) (-0.892) (0.997) 
Debt(t)  -0.022 -0.225 -1.718 0.704  0.487 -0.390 
(-0.018) (-0.178) (-0.892) (0.546)  (0.368) (-0.196)
trend  -0.595 -0.845 -1.856 
(-2.302) (-4.865) (-6.702)
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES NO  NO  NO 
N  608 608 608 608 608 608 
r2  0.616 0.618 0.180 0.584 0.610 0.144 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.654  0.687 0.031 0.775 0.445 0.032 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  2.628 11.112  13.034 2.603 11.604  13.643 
underidentification test p-value  0.004  2.1E-09 3.7E-09 0.010 5.4E-11  5.9E-11
NOTE: Dependent variable is Other Patents(t). T-statistics presented under estimates.  1 & 2 year lagged 
independent variables and 2-year lagged energy patents used as instruments for Other Patents(t-1) and Energy 
Patents.  Regressions run from 1973-1999, with lagged data back to 1970 used for instruments.  Energy prices 
and lagged energy prices also used as instruments in (4)-(6).  Other Patents(t-3) also used as an instrument in 




Table 11 – Crowding Out from Automotive Energy Patents 
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Other Patents (t-1)  0.417  0.504 0.272 0.477 0.552 0.365 
(1.272) (1.390) (0.797) (1.369) (1.444) (1.045) 
Energy Patents(t)  -0.511  -1.602 1.036 -0.729 -1.633 0.922 
(-0.171) (-0.434) (0.336) (-0.267) (-0.470) (0.337) 
Sales  (t-1)  1.014 0.404 2.108 0.587 0.063 1.709 
(0.817) (0.380) (1.958) (0.461) (0.058) (1.880) 
Capital(t)  4.655 5.210  5.016 5.514 
(1.706) (1.793)  (1.767) (1.803) 
Debt(t) -0.788  -0.715 
(-0.973) (-0.870) 
trend 0.578  0.504  0.782 
(0.740) (0.608) (0.908) 
Year Dummies  YES  YES  YES  NO  NO  NO 
N  254 254 254 254 254 254 
r2  0.703 0.692 0.660 0.690 0.681 0.653 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.194  0.053 0.081 0.168 0.040 0.109 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  1.667 2.287 2.686 1.673 2.283 2.939 
underidentification test p-value  0.255 0.121 0.035 0.280 0.148 0.031 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Other Patents(t). T-statistics presented under estimates.  1 & 2 year lagged 
independent variables and 2-year lagged energy patents used as instruments for Other Patents(t-1) and Energy 
Patents.  Regressions run from 1973-1999, with lagged data back to 1970 used for instruments.  Energy prices 
and lagged energy prices also used as instruments in (4)-(6).  
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Table 12 – Crowding Out from Automotive Energy Patents – Alternative Specifications  
 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Other Patents (t-1)  0.417  0.565  0.477  0.616 
(1.272) (3.404)  (1.369) (3.658) 
Energy Patents(t)  -0.511  -1.277 1.606 -0.729 -1.412 1.257 
(-0.171) (-0.560) (0.576) (-0.267) (-0.696) (0.484) 
Sales  (t-1)  1.014 0.599 2.192 0.587 0.239 1.805 
(0.817) (0.538) (2.161) (0.461) (0.218) (1.867) 
Capital(t)  4.655 5.234 3.037 5.016 5.525 3.440 
(1.706) (2.175) (1.238) (1.767) (2.255) (1.344) 
Debt(t)  -0.788 -0.728 -0.958 -0.715 -0.676 -0.848 
(-0.973) (-0.917) (-0.946) (-0.870) (-0.846) (-0.816)
trend  0.578 0.331 1.458 
(0.740) (0.738) (2.639) 
Year  Dummies  YES YES YES  NO  NO  NO 
N  254 254 254 254 254 254 
r2  0.703 0.718 0.578 0.690 0.704 0.524 
p-value for Hansen's J  0.194  0.208 0.380 0.168 0.109 0.029 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F stat  1.667 8.010 9.473 1.673 8.826 8.787 
underidentification test p-value  0.255 1.1E-04 6.0E-05 0.280 9.1E-04 0.001 
NOTE: Dependent variable is Other Patents(t). T-statistics presented under estimates.  1 & 2 year lagged 
independent variables and 2-year lagged energy patents used as instruments for Other Patents(t-1) and 
Energy Patents.  Regressions run from 1973-1999, with lagged data back to 1970 used for instruments.  
Energy prices and lagged energy prices also used as instruments in (4)-(6).  Other Patents(t-3) also used 
as an instrument in columns (2) and (5).  
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Table 13 – Correlations Among Refinery Patent Types 
 
A. Correlations with annual number of patents in each type, 1973-1999 







Wells 0.676  0.831 1
Other 0.574  0.813 0.894 1
Environment 0.746  0.781 0.689 0.640 1
Coal Fuels  0.182  0.496 0.582 0.772 0.301 1 
Alt Energy  0.243  0.662 0.583 0.744 0.376 0.850  1
 
 












% Refining  1 
% Chemistry  0.154  1
% Wells  -0.198  -0.355 1
% Other  -0.513  -0.805 0.128 1
% Environment  0.312  0.423 -0.069 -0.615 1
% Coal Fuels  -0.703  -0.543 0.046 0.595 -0.451 1 
% Alt Energy  -0.704  -0.222 -0.036 0.342 -0.391 0.776  1
 
C. Correlations with annual number of patents in each type, 1973-1987 







Wells 0.388  0.583 1
Other 0.488  0.516 0.315 1
Environment 0.161  0.603 0.301 0.350 1
Coal Fuels  0.334  0.255 0.193 0.819 0.211 1 
Alt Energy  0.380  0.646 0.296 0.757 0.418 0.747  1
 












% Refining  1 
% Chemistry  -0.465  1
% Wells  0.337  0.033 1
% Other  0.329  -0.878 -0.148 1
% Environment  -0.142  0.285 0.071 -0.324 1
% Coal Fuels  -0.391  -0.420 -0.562 0.257 -0.302 1 
% Alt Energy  -0.601  0.197 -0.648 -0.296 -0.136 0.634  1
Tables show the correlation between patents in each technology group.  The top two panels include all refinery 
patents with application years between 1973-1999.  The bottom two panels include all refinery patents with 




Table 14 – Descriptive Data on Citations and Generality 
 
      citations generality 
N  mean std  dev mean std  dev 
Alternative Energy 
     Energy  2,018  8.722  10.682  0.509  0.342 
     Non-energy  49,295  6.658  8.840  0.470  0.364 
Automotive 
     Energy  1,519  7.840  8.721  0.422  0.351 
     Non-energy  43,062  6.718  8.206  0.434  0.358 
Refineries 
     Alternative energy  302  7.805  6.662  0.631  0.298 
     Coal-based fuels  627  6.260  6.306  0.424  0.353 
     Refining  3,152  7.076  8.733  0.422  0.343 
     Environmental  995  7.513  9.023  0.483  0.354 
     Chemistry  7,442  7.606  12.303  0.529  0.357 
     Wells  2,362  6.738  7.132  0.410  0.352 
     Other Technologies  9,778  5.741  7.408  0.437  0.370 
Descriptive data on patents from 1975-1999.  
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Table 15 – Are Alternative Energy Patents More Valuable? 
 
A. All Patents 
Variable Citations Generality 
Alternative Energy patent  1.1548 0.0595 
(5.735) (3.858) 
Automotive Energy Patent  1.5260 0.0987 
(15.209) (5.473) 
Alternative Energy firm  1.8813 0.1471 
(3.901) (1.415) 
Chemistry patent  0.9413 0.0376 
 (-4.905) (4.824) 
Computer patent  1.3542 0.1455 
(19.039) (14.400) 
Medical patent  0.7708 -0.1167 
 (-5.441)  (-3.844) 
Electronics patent  1.0503 -0.0255 
(3.742)  (-3.072) 
Mechanical patent  0.9647 -0.0606 
    (-2.997)  (-7.992) 
Σ  0.5958 






log-likelihood -258451.96 -78550.89 
 
B. Refinery Patents Only 
Variable Citations Generality 
Alternative Energy patent  1.0711 0.2551 
(1.349) (6.591) 
Coal-based Fuel patent  0.8284 -0.0366 
 (-4.177)  (-1.250) 
Chemistry patent  1.1239 0.1279 
(5.130) (8.959) 
Wells patent  1.0329 -0.0270 
(1.162)  (-1.468) 
Environment patent  1.1043 0.0715 
(2.640) (2.986) 
Other patent  0.8555 -0.0182 
    (-7.177)  (-1.300) 
Σ  0.6123 






log-likelihood -71205.43 -22082.40 
NOTES: T-statistics in parentheses.  Generality results from a Tobit regression, and 
citation results from a general negative binomial regression. Citation results presented 
as e
β, and are interpreted as the likelihood of receiving a citation, compared to the base 
case of a non-energy automotive patent in panel A, or a refining patent in panel B.  
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The figure shows company-financed and federal-government financed energy R&D performed by industry from 
1973-1997.  All values are in 2000 dollars.  
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Figure 2 – Total Alternative Energy Patents from All Energy Firms, by Application Year 
 
 
The figure shows the total number of alternative energy patents and non-energy patents assigned to firms in our 
regression analysis.  The number of energy patents is on the left axis, and number of other and related patents is on 
the right axis.  Patents are sorted by the year of application.  
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Figure 3 – Total Automotive Energy Patents from All Energy Firms, by Application Year 
 
 
The figure shows the total number of energy patents and non-energy patents assigned to firms in our automotive 
energy regression analysis.  The number of energy patents is on the left axis, and number of other and related 

































Figure includes refinery patents with application years between 1970-1999.  The number of Chemistry and Other patents is divided 
by 10 for ease of presentation. 
 A1 
 
Appendix A – Patent Classes for Energy Patents 
NOTE: Patent classes for the alternative energy data set are based on the U.S. patent 
classification system.  Patent classes for the automotive energy data set are based on the 








48/200  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Processes/Coal, oil and water 
48/201  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Processes/Coal and oil 
48/202  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Processes/Coal and water 
48/210  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Processes/Coal 
48/71  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Cupola/Coal, oil and water 
48/72  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Cupola/Coal and oil 
48/73  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Cupola/Coal and water 
48/77  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Cupola/Producers/Coal 
48/98  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Retort/Coal, oil and water 
48/99  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Retort/Coal and water 
48/100  Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Retort/Coal and oil   
48/101     Gas: Heating and Illuminating/Generators/Retort/Coal 
 
Solar Energy: 
60/641.8-641.15 Power  Plants/Utilizing natural heat/Solar 
62/235.1 Refrigeration/Utilizing solar energy 
126/561-568  Stoves and Furnaces/Solar heat collector for pond or pool 
126/569-713  Stoves and Furnaces/Solar heat collector 
126/903 Stoves  and  Furnaces/Cross-Reference  Art/Solar collector cleaning device 
126/904 Stoves  and  Furnaces/Cross-Reference  Art/Arrangements for sealing solar 
collector 
126/905 Stoves  and  Furnaces/Cross-Reference Art/Preventing condensing of 
moisture in solar collector 
126/906 Stoves  and  Furnaces/Cross-Reference Art/Connecting plural solar 
collectors in a circuit 
126/910  Stoves and Furnaces/Cross-Reference Art/Heat storage liquid 
 
Solar Energy – Batteries: 
136/206  Batteries: Thermoelectric and Photoelectric/Thermoelectric/Electric power 
generator/ Solar energy type 
136/243  Batteries: Thermoelectric and Photoelectric/Photoelectric 
136/244-251  Batteries: Thermoelectric and Photoelectric/Photoelectric/Panel 
136/252-265  Batteries: Thermoelectric and Photoelectric/Photoelectric/Cells A2 
 
Fuel Cells: 
429/12-46 Chemistry:  Electrical  Current Producing Apparatus, Product, and 
Process/Fuel cell, subcombination thereof or method of operating 
 
Wind: 
290/44   Prime-Mover Dynamo Plants/Electric control/Fluid-current motors/Wind 
290/55   Prime-Mover Dynamo Plants/Fluid-current motors/Wind 
416/132B   Fluid Reaction Surfaces (i.e., Impellers)/Articulated resiliently mounted or 
selfshifting impeller or working member/Sectional, staged or non-rigid 
working member/windmills 
416/196A   Fluid Reaction Surfaces (i.e., Impellers)/Lashing between working 
members or external bracing/Connecting adjacent work surfaces/Non-
turbo machine (windmills) 
416/197A   Fluid Reaction Surfaces (i.e., Impellers)/Cupped reaction surface normal 
to rotation plane/Air and water motors (natural fluid currents) 
 
Using waste as fuel: 
110/235-259 Furnaces/Refuse  incinerator 
110/346 Furnaces/Incinerating  refuse 
 
Geothermal energy: 





(((((fuel OR gas*) <near/1> (consum* OR use OR using OR usage OR burn*)) <near/3> 
(reduc* OR less OR lower)) <in> (AB, TI, BACKGROUND)) OR ((((fuel OR gas*) 
<near/1> (efficien* OR economy OR mileage)) <near/3> (improv* OR increas* OR 
better OR greater)) <in> (AB, TI, BACKGROUND))) AND (internal combustion <in> 
(AB, TI, BACKGROUND)) 
 
Fuel cells:  
H01M 8  PROCESSES OR MEANS, e.g. BATTERIES, FOR THE DIRECT 
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL ENERGY INTO ELECTRICAL 
ENERGY /Fuel cells; Manufacture thereof 
 
Electric & hybrid vehicles: 
B60W 20   CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT 
TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS 
SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE 
DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO 
THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT /Control systems 
specially adapted for hybrid vehicles, i.e. vehicles having two or more 
prime movers of more than one type, e.g. electrical and internal 
combustion motors, all used for propulsion of the vehicle   
B60L 7 NOT B60L 7/28  ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR PROPULSION OF 
ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; MAGNETIC 
SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; 
ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN 
GENERAL/ Electrodynamic brake systems for vehicles in general   
B60L 8  ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-
PROPELLED VEHICLES; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR 
LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE 
SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN GENERAL/ Electric propulsion with 
power supply from force of nature, e.g. sun, wind   
B60L 11  ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-
PROPELLED VEHICLES; MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR 
LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE 
SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN GENERAL/ Electric propulsion with 
power supplied within the vehicle   
  
Appendix B – Patent Classes for Refineries 
 
In addition to the alternative energy patent classes in Appendix A, the following patent classes 




208/088-091  Mineral Oils: Processes and Products/Chemical Conversion of 
Hydrocarbons/With preliminary treatment of feed/Refining 
208/097-099  Mineral Oils: Processes and Products/Chemical Conversion of 
Hydrocarbons/With subsequent treatment of products/Refining 
208/177-307  Mineral Oils: Processes and Products/Refining (except where noted 
below under environmental classes) 
 
Catalytic cracking 
208/108-112  Mineral Oils: Processes and Products/Chemical Conversion of 
Hydrocarbons/Cracking/Hydrogenative/Catalytic 




585/446-468  Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds/Aromatic Compound 
Synthesis/By condensation of entire molecules or entire hydrocarbyl 
moieties thereof, e.g., alkylation, etc/Using metal, metal oxide, or 
hydroxide catalyst 
585/709-732  Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds/Saturated Compound 
Synthesis/By condensation of a paraffin molecule with an olefin-acting 
molecule, e.g., alkylation, etc. 
 
Catalytic Reforming: 
208/134-141  Mineral Oils: Processes and Products/Chemical Conversion of 
Hydrocarbons/Reforming/Catalytic 
 
Chemical conversion of hydrocarbons: 
208/046-176  Mineral Oils: Processes and Products/Chemical Conversion of 






405  Hydraulic and Earth Engineering 
507  Earth Boring, Well Treating, and Oil Field Chemistry (except where 
noted below) 
 
Enhanced oil recovery 










423  Chemistry of Inorganic Compounds 
428  Stock Material or Miscellaneous Articles 
520-528  Synthetic Resins or Natural Rubbers -- Part of the Class 520 Series 








585/253  Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds/Adding Hydrogen to Unsaturated 
Bond of Hydrocarbon, i.e., Hydrogenation/With subsequent diverse 
conversion/Isomerization 
585/477-482  Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds/Aromatic Compound 
Synthesis/By isomerization 
585/664-670  Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds/Unsaturated Compound 
Synthesis/By double-bond shift isomerization 
585/671  Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds/Unsaturated Compound 
Synthesis/By skeletal isomerization 




166/402-403 Wells/Processes/Distinct,  separate injection and producing 
wells/Sequentially injected separate fluids (e.g., slugs)/Injecting a gas or 
gas mixture/CO2 or carbonated gas  
 
Reformulated gas/adding ethers, MTBE, etc. 
44/438  Fuel and Related Compositions/Organic oxygen compound containing 
(e.g. , alicyclic alcohols, hypochorites, etc.)/The oxygen is part of a –
C(=O)- group/With alkanol or dialkyl ether 
44/446  Fuel and Related Compositions/Organic oxygen compound containing 
(e.g. , alicyclic alcohols, hypochorites, etc.)/Alkanol compound with 
diaklyl ether compound 
44/447-449  Fuel and Related Compositions/Organic oxygen compound containing 
(e.g. , alicyclic alcohols, hypochorites, etc.)/Ether 
44/451-453  Fuel and Related Compositions/Organic oxygen compound containing 
(e.g. , alicyclic alcohols, hypochorites, etc.)/Alkanol 
568/692-699  Organic Compounds – Part of the 532-570 Series/Oxygen Containing 
(e.g., Perchlorylbenzene, etc.)/Ethers/Acyclic/Preparing by 
dehydrohalogenaition [This is 692.  Others also are variants of processes 
using hydration) 
 
Removal of gases (e.g. SO2, NOX, hydrogen sulfides) 
423/210-248  Chemistry of Inorganic Compounds/Modifying or Removing Component of 
Normally Gaseous Mixture  
423/569-577  Chemistry of Inorganic Compounds/Sulfur or Compound Thereof/Reducing 
sulfur dioxide by carbon containing material 
 
Emissions control 
422/168-183  Chemical Apparatus and Process: Disinfecting, Deodorizing, Preserving, 




405/60-72  Hydraulic and Earth Engineering/Fluid Control, Treatment, or 
Containment/Floatable Matter Containment 
210/671  Liquid Purification or Separation/Processes/Ion exchange or selective 
sorption/Including diverse separating or treating of liquid/Of oil sorbent material 
210/680  Liquid Purification or Separation/Processes/Ion exchange or selective 
sorption/Utilizing exchange or sorbent material associated with inert 
material/Including oil sorbent 
210/693  Liquid Purification or Separation/Processes/Ion exchange or selective 
sorption/Sorbing organic constituent/From aqueous material/Utilizing synthetic 
resin/Oil removed 
210/776  Liquid Purification or Separation/Processes/Separating/Skimming 
210/242.3  Liquid Purification or Separation/With Movable Support/Float/With oil water 
skimmer 
210/242.4  Liquid Purification or Separation/With Movable Support/Float/With oil water 
sorption means 
210/922-925  Liquid Purification or Separation/Cross-Reference Art Collections: Miscellaneous 
Specific Techniques/Oil spill cleanup (e.g., bacterial, etc.) 
 
Water Pollution 
Rather than using patent classes to identify these patents, the following keyword search of patent 
abstracts was used: 
(water <near/5> (pollut* OR effluent)) OR (waste <near/1> water) OR (ground <near/1> 
water) OR wastewater OR groundwater 
 